publications

Conclusion

Scores of ordinary citizens of Rivers State were gunned down in the streets in July and August 2007 in violence that in large part has its roots in the criminal conduct of their politicians. The scenes witnessed in the streets during the peak of that bloodshed were shocking enough in and of themselves. But perhaps even more disturbing is the undeniable fact that such mayhem has become a routine part of politics in Rivers State, tacitly accepted by the federal government and Nigeria’s police.

The JTF’s intervention brought an end to the worst of Rivers State’s post-election violence in August 2007. Since then JTF forces have prevented the situation from sliding backwards. But the JTF can do nothing more than keep a lid on Rivers’ underlying problems. 

President Umaru Yar’Adua’s much-heralded promises of a comprehensive peace initiative for the Niger Delta—which would end the violence, integrate erstwhile gang members into legitimate economic activity within the state, and promote economic development—have thus far come to nothing. A December 2007 meeting meant to secure “peace” between various armed gangs and the government in Bayelsa State, immediately west of Rivers, was widely condemned as a crude and expensive farce and has led nowhere.156 Meanwhile the federal government has done nothing to help end the theft and squandering of resources that are more than adequate to begin addressing the socioeconomic causes of violence in the Niger Delta, or to hold politicians to account for funneling those resources into violence.

The first steps are obvious but none of them has been taken: The federal government and the police should launch a wide-ranging investigation into the links between armed gangs and politicians in Rivers State in order to hold those responsible to account, including through criminal prosecutions. The police and JTF should redouble efforts to apprehend and prosecute Soboma George, Ateke Tom, and other leading gang members.

Federal authorities should also display a greater commitment to ending the rampant corruption that has fueled the arming and growth of criminal gangs in Rivers State; this should begin with a full criminal investigation into the eight-year tenure of former governor Peter Odili. The EFCC has already compiled significant documentation against him but the case has not moved forward despite the private claims of EFCC officials that ample evidence has already been amassed.157 These steps would help signal an end to the impunity the authors of the crimes documented in this report have come to rely on and take for granted.

Unless these steps are taken urgently, the result will be a continuation of the status quo. The residents of Rivers State will go on living in poverty while seeing their state’s massive wealth channeled into violence that has already shattered too many lives. More hopefully, serious attempts to approve the quality of governance and bring an end to the rampant criminal activity fueled by many Rivers politicians today could begin to reverse that cruel paradox and transform the future of Rivers State.  



156 Alex Last, “Nigeria oil peace deal a ‘stunt.’” BBC News Online, December 6, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7131526.stm (accessed February 21, 2008).

157 Human Rights Watch interviews with EFCC officials (names withheld), Abuja and Washington DC, October 2006, and October 2007 and November 2007.