publications

<<previous  |  index  |  next>>

II. Background

Child labor is widespread in Indonesia.  The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that there are 4,201,452 children below the age of eighteen involved in potentially hazardous work; more than 1.5 million are girls.12  A 2002-2003 baseline survey conducted by the University of Indonesia and the International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) (the child labor arm of the ILO) estimated that there were 2.6 million domestic workers in Indonesia out of which at minimum 688,132 (34.83 percent) were children; 93 percent of those were girls under the age of eighteen.13  In contrast, in 2001 the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated that there were 579,059 domestic workers out of which 152,184 (26.7 percent) were children.14  The ILO questioned the methodology of the government survey, concluding that the government’s figure underestimated the actual number of domestic workers in the country.15 

Domestic Workers in Indonesia

Domestic work in Indonesia, and around the world, is performed largely by women and girls and is often considered a natural extension of women’s work in society, namely the maintenance of the home and family.  The work is situated in the private sphere and is unregulated and shielded from public scrutiny.  The ILO estimates that more girls under sixteen work in domestic service than in any other category of child labor worldwide.16  Because it is performed predominantly by women and girls, and is frequently seen as an extension of unpaid daily household work, domestic work is considered as unskilled and menial labor.17  Notably, domestic workers are commonly referred to as “pembantu”(helpers) and not “pekerja” (workers) by both the government and employers.  This description is convenient as it suggests that their labor is non-remunerative. 

Family members of domestic workers as well as suppliers of domestic workers Human Rights Watch spoke with indicated that domestic work is done predominantly by girls.  For instance, when we asked a family member of a domestic worker whether any boys in their family are domestics, the family member laughed and said, “No boys work as domestic workers . . . because the pay is too low to support a family;” instead they “work in the factory.”18  Similarly, an official from a domestic worker supplier agency told us, “Most here [agency] are girls.  But some boys come to our company.  We place them as drivers, security, [and] gardening.  Sometimes boys come, but they prefer to go to factories rather than homes.”19 

In Indonesia, domestic service traditionally was not regarded as formal employment, but as an informal relationship between the employer and the domestic.20  The remuneration for such service was typically accommodation, food, or a small monetary gift at Eid-ul-Fitr, rather than regular wages.21  In Javanese tradition, taking poor relatives into the household was known as the ngenger custom.  Under this tradition, young boys and girls would leave their villages to live with a prosperous uncle or aunt or acquaintance of the family on the premise that the children would be sent to school and would be taken care of.  In return, these children were expected to do household work.22  Whatever may have been the case historically, current practices are a far cry from such romanticized notions.

Push and Pull Factors

The progressive urbanization of Indonesia has led to an increased demand for domestic workers by the middle class.  More young families are migrating to the cities and women continue to enter the formal workforce.  Demand has expanded in particular for girls under fifteen to assist in child rearing and household tasks.23 

The demand for children over adults is particularly high because children are cheaper and seen as easier to control than adults.24 We were told by a domestic worker supplier agency that the agency supplies only children because there is a demand for children.25  Labor agents told Human Rights Watch that employers prefer hiring children because they are “cheaper than adults” and “can be easily managed.”26   The ILO-IPEC study on child domestic workers in Indonesia similarly found that adults command a higher salary even though the tasks they perform are the same.27

NGOs, as well as an official from ILO-IPEC, told Human Rights Watch that migration of adults abroad also contributes to the demand for children in Indonesia.28  The legal age for migration abroad is eighteen; wages tend to be higher and, thus, the work more desirable.29  For example, Indonesian domestic workers in Singapore typically earn 220-280 Singapore dollars (U.S.$133-170) per month, in Malaysia about 350-450 ringgit (U.S.$98-118) per month, and in Hong Kong, the minimum wage for foreign domestic workers is 3270 Hong Kong dollars (U.S.$420), though many get paid less than half of that.30  In comparison, domestic workers in Indonesia typically earn Rp. 300,000 (U.S.$33.33) a  month.31  Indonesia is a major supplier of migrant domestic workers to Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and East Asian countries.  According to the World Bank and the Indonesian government, in 2002 76 percent of 480,393 overseas workers from Indonesia were women and 94 percent of these women were employed as domestic workers in these countries.32  Human Rights Watch spoke with some girls who said they wanted to become migrant domestic workers when they turned eighteen because they believed they would be paid better wages abroad than in Indonesia.33 

In addition to the pull of demand from employers, poverty and a lack of access to education push children into work.  Many poor families in rural areas are unable to meet their economic needs and rely on children to supplement the household income.34  Moreover, the 1997-1998 economic crisis led to an increase in child labor in the urban areas, including in the unregulated informal sector.35

Education expenses, such as school tuition and infrastructure fees (to pay for upkeep of school facilities), uniforms, books, and transportation, are an additional burden on poor families.  The United Nations Human Development Report 2004 on Indonesia (Human Development Report) notes that although a vast majority of children enroll in school, only about half complete nine years of basic education.36  According to the report, around 18 percent of children drop out before completing primary school, while the rest do not enter or do not complete lower secondary school because of poverty, incidental fees, and expenses for uniforms and books, as well as the quality of education.37 

School fees have not been abolished in Indonesia.  Schools charge tuition and infrastructure fees.38  Katarina Tomaševski, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, concluded in her 2002 examination of the education system in Indonesia that poverty and costs are the key obstacles to children’s access to education.39  She further noted that schools’ reliance on parental financial contribution put “schools in poor communities at a disadvantage.”40  Such fees are also used for maintenance of school facilities, which the Human Development Report noted are in a “decrepit state.”41 

Both poverty and education costs thus push children to drop out of school and enter the informal sector where no specialized education is needed.  This in turn creates a next generation of workers confined to low-skill, low-paid jobs who, in turn, are less likely to be able to educate their own children. 

Recruitment of Children

Children are typically recruited from rural or poor urban areas to work as domestic workers in larger cities.  Human Rights Watch interviewed children who were recruited by other domestic workers, relatives, neighbors, friends, and labor agents.  An Atma Jaya University survey in the Jakarta area identified two types of domestic worker recruiters—formal and informal.42  Under the formal method, a domestic worker supplier agency, pursuant to a 1993 local government regulation in Jakarta, may recruit domestic workers over the age of fifteen upon written permission from their parents.43  The informal method of recruitment, on the other hand, involves vegetable vendors, small butchers, relatives, and other domestic workers, who recruit from their home villages.  They are a large source for recruiting child domestics, and are difficult to control.44  An NGO working with child domestic workers similarly told us that such informal recruiters play a significant role in the recruitment process.45

A survey carried out by an NGO in Yogyakarta found the following recruitment patterns in Central Java:  a villager may act as a local agent for prospective employers or outsider recruiters in exchange for a fee, or informal recruiters and employers may visit the village and recruit directly, sometimes with the local villager as an intermediary.46

Recruiters have significant monetary incentive to recruit children for domestic work.  A labor agent in Jakarta informed us that she recruits thirteen children a month and is paid Rp.190,000 (U.S.$21.11) per child by the domestic worker supplier agency.47  Thus, a labor agent could earn as much as U.S.$275 a month for recruiting thirteen children, and earn more than triple the minimum wage in Jakarta, which in 2004 was Rp.671,843 (U.S.$74.64).  A labor agency in Jakarta, on the other hand, is paid Rp.350,000 (U.S.$38.88) per child by an employer.  According to agency officials the agency usually houses one hundred girls per day waiting to be placed as domestic workers.48 

Human Rights Watch was allowed a short tour of a domestic worker supplier agency in Jakarta, but we were not allowed to interview most of the girls.  We saw several small, overcrowded rooms full of girls, a few older women, and some men.  The rooms had wooden platforms for sleeping and a communal kitchen.  While we were being shown the facilities, we saw four girls who appeared much younger than fifteen with bags at their feet—they had just arrived.  Each said that she was fifteen years old and would like a job in a supermarket.49  We also observed a poster on the wall, which stated, “Things that make a good employer: (1) proper salary every month; (2) enough food; (3) if you’re sick, the employer takes you to the doctor.”

Vulnerability to Trafficking

Domestic workers’ exclusion from Indonesia’s labor law, combined with the lack of government regulation and monitoring of recruitment and working conditions, leaves child domestic workers highly susceptible to being trafficked into forced labor.  Child trafficking is a practice similar to slavery and is one of the worst forms of child labor, which governments have an affirmative obligation to prevent.50 

Child trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purposes of sexual or labor exploitation, forced labor, or slavery.51  Exploitation includes “at a minimum, the exploitation of or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”52  Where children, as opposed to adults, are concerned, trafficking can exist in the absence of coercion, abduction, fraud, or deception.53

The ILO considers a child to be trafficked into domestic service when she is “obliged to leave her . . . home village to go the city to find work and who is recruited into domestic service where the conditions are exploitative (for example, the child is ‘paid’ in food and lodging rather than receiving a wage).”54  The ILO explains that even if the relocation element of trafficking is voluntarily, if the domestic service is exploitative and satisfies any of the criteria for the worst forms of child labor, then the child is considered to be trafficked, and the employers are traffickers under international law.55 



[12] ILO, A Series of Policy Recommendations: Eliminating the Worst Forms of Child Labor (Jakarta: ILO, 2004), p. 4.

[13] ILO-IPEC, Bunga-bunga di Atas Padas: Fenomena Pekerja Rumah Tangga Anak Di Indonesia (Flowers on the Rock: Phenomenon of Child Domestic Workers in Indonesia) (Jakarta: ILO, 2004), pp. xix, 21; see also Panudda Boonpala & Tina Staermose, ILO Policy Framework and Challenges, Combating Child Domestic Labor in South East Asia (Bangkok: ILO, 2003). 

[14] ILO-IPEC, Flowers on the Rock, p. 21. 

[15] The ILO-IPEC survey was conducted in Bekasi and East Jakarta and the data was extrapolated for other provinces in Indonesia, excluding Aceh, Maluku, and North Maluku.  Ibid. pp. 25-29.  The survey used the same methodology as that used by Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics, but ILO-IPEC used a larger sample per census block.  For instance, the ILO-IPEC survey included fifty households per census, whereas the Central Bureau of Statistics survey used only sixteen households. The ILO-IPEC study concluded that the Central Bureau of Statistics “underestimated” the number of domestic workers.  Ibid. pp. 21, 25. 

[16] ILO-IPEC, Helping Hand or Shackled Lives: Understanding Child Domestic Labor and Responses to it (Geneva: ILO, 2004), p. 14.

[17] UNICEF, “Child Domestic Work,” Innocenti Digest No. 5 (Florence: UNICEF, 1999), p. 2.

[18] Human Rights Watch interview with Sumar, an uncle of a former child domestic worker, Yogyakarta, December 1, 2004.

[19] Human Rights Watch interview with Ramahadas Fro Marss, lawyer at Asosiasi Pengelola Pramuwisma Seluruh Indonesia, domestic worker supplier agency, Jakarta, November 30, 2004.

[20] C.G. Weix, “Inside the Home and Outside the Family—The Domestic Engagement of Javanese Servants,” eds. Kathleen M. Adams and Sara Dickey, Home and Hegemony—Domestic Service and Identity Politics in South and Southeast Asia (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 137-156.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Human Rights Watch interview with Lita Angraeni, Rumpun Tjoet Njak Dien, Yogyakarta, December 1, 2004.

[23] ILO-IPEC, Flowers on the Rock, p. 14; see also International Catholic Migration Commission, Trafficking of Women and Children in Asia (Jakarta: ICMC, 2003), pp. 56-57; Chris Manning, The Economic Crisis and Child Labor in Indonesia, ILO-IPEC Working Paper (Geneva: ILO-IPEC, 2000), pp. 6, 40-41. 

[24] Human Rights Watch interview with Lita Angraeni, Rumpun Tjoet Njak Dien, Yogyakarta, December 1, 2004.

[25] Human Rights Watch interview with Ramahadas Fro Marss, lawyer at Asosiasi Pengelola Pramuwisma Seluruh Indonesia, domestic worker supplier agency, Jakarta, November 30, 2004.

[26] Human Rights Watch interview Tarsiyah, labor agent, Jakarta, November 30, 2004.

[27] ILO-IPEC, Flowers on the Rock, p. 91.

[28] Human Rights Watch interview with Lita Angraeni, Rumpun Tjoet Njak Dien, Yogyakarta, December 1, 2004; Human Rights Watch interview with Winarti Sukaesih, Yayasan Kesejahteraan Anak Indonesia (YKAI), Jakarta, November 29, 2004; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Pandji Putranto, Senior Program Officer, ILO-IPEC, March 28, 2005.

[29] Human Rights Watch interview with Lita Angraeni, Rumpun Tjoet Njak Dien, Yogyakarta, December 1, 2004; Human Rights Watch interview with Winarti Sukaesih, Yayasan Kesejahteraan Anak Indonesia (YKAI), Jakarta, November 29, 2004.

[30] Despite these higher wages, many domestic workers do not receive any salary for the first 3-10 months of work because of debt payments to labor agents.  Furthermore, many employers withhold migrant domestic workers’ salaries or only pay them a portion of their rightful earnings.  Human Rights Watch, Help Wanted: Abuses against Female Migrant Domestic Workers in Indonesia and Malaysia (July 2004), pp. 42-44 (Human Rights Watch found that Indonesian domestic workers in Malaysia work long hours without overtime pay; have no rest days; suffer from restrictions on their freedom of movement; are psychologically, physically and sexually abused; are forcibly confined; are not paid their full wages; and are trafficked into forced labor); see also Human Rights Watch, Bad Dreams: Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant Workers in Saudi Arabia (August 2004).

[31] Ridwan Max Sijabat, “Malaysia and RI Dishonest on Illegal Workers, The Jakarta Post, November 12, 2004.

[32] Chitrawati Buchori, Farida Sondakh, and Tita Naovalitha, “TKW’s Vulnerability: Searching for Solutions,” paper presented at World Bank, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 29, 2003, p. 1. 

[33] Migrant workers also include girls who travel with falsified passports with their ages changed.  As Human Rights Watch found, Indonesian women and girls had their passport altered so they would appear to be at least twenty-five because Malaysia requires domestic workers to be between twenty-five to forty-five years old.  Human Rights Watch, Help Wanted, p. 29.

[34] Human Rights Watch interview with Lita Angraeni, Rumpun Tjoet Njak Dien, Yogyakarta, December 1, 2004.

[35] ILO, A Series of Policy Recommendations: Eliminating the Worst Forms of Child Labor, p. 3.  See also Chris Manning, The Economic Crisis and Child Labor in Indonesia, p. 23.

[36] United Nations Development Program, Indonesia Human Development Report 2004 (New York: UNDP, 2004), p. 35.

[37] Ibid.  The mean years of schooling for women in 2002 were 6.5 compared to 7.6 years for men.  Ibid., p. 124.  In 2002, the net enrollment in primary schools was 93 percent, whereas that for lower secondary school was only 62 percent. Enrollment, however, was found to be even lower in rural areas (54 percent) compared to urban areas (72 percent).  Ibid., p. 35.

[38] Human Rights Watch interview with Wardina, Bekasi, December 18, 2004; Human Rights Watch interview with Suwaski, father of a domestic worker, Yogyakarta, December 2, 2004; Human Rights Watch interview with Wida, mother of domestic worker, Yogyakarta, December 2, 2004.

[39] U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The Right to Education, Report Submitted by Katarina Tomaševski, Special Rapporteur in accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/23, Addendum, Mission to Indonesia July 1-7, 2002, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/9/Add.1, November 4, 2002, para. 23 (also concluding that distance from the closest school; and a lack of compatibility between the school schedule and daily, weekly, and annual schedules for working children are obstacles to children’s accessibility to education)

[40] Ibid., para. 41.

[41] Human Rights Watch interview with Yustina Rostiawati, Atma Jaya University, Jakarta, November 30, 2004; UNDP, Indonesia Human Development Report 2004, p. 37 (citing the Director General for Elementary Education at the Ministry of Education Indradjati Sidi, who stated that more than thirty percent of the elementary schools in the country were ruined or were in a state of irreversible decay).  See also B. Herry-Priyono, “Our Education: Schooling in Ruined Buildings,” The Jakarta Post, May 14, 2005 (citing data 2003-2004 data from the Ministry of Education which noted that 57.67 percent of elementary school buildings and 16.30 percent of junior high school buildings were in a state of decay).

[42] Jonathan Blagbrough, Child Domestic Work in Indonesia (London: Anti-Slavery International, 1995), p. 19 (citing Atma Jaya Research Center, Child Domestic Workers in the Greater Jakarta Area, p. 13).

[43] Ibid.  The 1993 Jakarta regulation is discussed in sections III and V.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Human Rights Watch interview with Rumpun Gema Perempuan, Jakarta, November 30, 2004.

[46] Jonathan Blagbrough, Child Domestic Work in Indonesia, p. 19 (citing SAMIN, Child Domestic Servants of the Kampong of Temalang the Survey Report, p. 12).

[47] Human Rights Watch interview with Tarsiyah, labor agent, Jakarta, November 30, 2004.

[48] Human Rights Watch interview with Sugito, Asosiasi Pengelola Pramuwisma Seluruh Indonesia, domestic worker supplier agency, Jakarta, November 30, 2004.

[49] Human Rights Watch interview with four girls, Jakarta, November 30, 2004.

[50] Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, art. 3(a); Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 32, 35-36.

[51] Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Trafficking Protocol), G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001) (entered into force September 9, 2003, signed by Indonesia on December 12, 2000), art. 3. A trafficked victim cannot “consent” to the exploitation under the Trafficking Protocol.  Ibid., art. 3(b). 

[52] Trafficking Protocol, art, 3(a).  Forced labor is defined as “work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”  ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1930, ratified by Indonesia on June 12, 1950), art. 2.  The ILO Committee of Experts clarifies that the “menace of any penalty . . . need not be in the form of penal sanctions, but might take the form also of a loss of rights or privileges.” International Labor Conference, 1979 General Survey of the Reports relating to the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1975 (No. 105), Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 65th Session, Geneva, 1979, Report III, para. 21.  The ILO identifies instances of lack of consent to include:  physical confinement in the workplace, psychological compulsion, physical abduction, deception or false promises about types of work and terms of work, withholding or non-payment of wages, retention of identity documents, birth/descent into slave or bonded status, sale of person into the ownership of another, and induced indebtedness.  Evidence of menace of penalty includes:  physical violence against worker or family or close associates, sexual violence, threat of supernatural retaliation, imprisonment or physical confinement, financial penalties, denunciation to police or immigration authorities and deportation, dismissal from current employment, exclusion from future employment, exclusion from community and social life, removal of rights or privileges, deprivation of food, shelter or other necessities, shift to even worse working conditions, and loss of social status.  ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labor: Global Report under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work (Geneva: ILO, 2005), pp.  5-6, Box 1.1.

[53] Trafficking Protocol, art. 3(c).

[54] ILO, Helping Hands, p.12.

[55] Ibid.


<<previous  |  index  |  next>>June 2005