VII. BANANA EXPORTS AND TRADE REGIMESHuman Rights Watch believes that there is an inherent link between labor rights and trade. When countries or regions engage in trade, they have a fundamental obligation to ensure that the goods being traded are not produced in violation of internationally recognized labor rights, including freedom of association and the prohibition of the worst forms of child labor. As the two largest importers of Ecuadorian bananas, importing in 2000 roughly one million metric tons and 680,000 metric tons of Ecuadorian bananas, respectively,361 the United States and the European Union should be able to guarantee that trade provisions governing the import of Ecuadorian bananas include provisions that ensure respect for the labor rights of banana workers in Ecuador. Nevertheless, because of the current structure of U.S. and E.U. tariff arrangements for the importation of Ecuadorian bananas, such conditionality is likely precluded by the terms of the World Trade Organization (WTO), of which the United States, E.U. countries, and Ecuador are members.
European Union Banana Importation Regimes
361 Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Robert Miller, USDA. In 2000, these totals constituted approximately 24 percent and 17 percent of Ecuador's banana exports, respectively. 362 United States International Trade Commission (USITC), "Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2001)," USITC Publication 3378 (2001), chapter 8-3; USITC, "Andean Trade Preferences Act: Impact on the United States," USITC Publication 3234 (September 1999), pp. 69, 75. NTR is the norm in the United States' bilateral trade relationships, and the U.S. has extended NTR status to all WTO members as well as most other nations. International Trade Data System. (August 17, 2001). Normal Trade Relations. [Online]. Available: http://www.itds.tread.gov/mfn.htm [September 10, 2001]. 363 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(G); 19 U.S.C. § 3202(c)(7). "Internationally recognized worker rights," in this context, are defined to include the right of association; the right to organize and bargain collectively; a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; a minimum age for the employment of children; and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. 19 U.S.C. § 2467(4). In addition, goods covered by U.S. GSP may enter the United States duty free only if the exporting country has also "implemented its commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor." 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(H). 364 As in the United States, fresh bananas are not covered by the European Union's GSP regime, though plantains, fresh and dried, and dried bananas are covered. Under this regime, GSP benefits may be withdrawn in cases of slavery, forced labor, "serious and systematic violation of the [right of] freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining or the principle of non-discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, or use of child labour, as defied in the relevant ILO Conventions," or if exported products were made with prison labor. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001, December 10, 2001, Articles 4, 26; Annex IV. 365 Council Regulation (EEC) No 416/2001, February 28, 2001, Annex IV. 366 WTO. (No date). Relevant WTO provisions: descriptions. [Online]. Available: http:///www.wto.org [September 10, 2001]. 367 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, July 1986, Articles I:1, XIII: 1. 368 Ibid., Article XX (a), (b). 369 Council Regulation (EEC), No. 404/93, February 13, 1993. 370 Raj Bhala, "The Bananas War," 31 McGeorge Law Review 3 (2000), in Raj Bhala, International Trade Law: Theory and Practice (Danvers, Massachusetts: Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 2000), p. 1466. The system distinguishes among the traditional ACP countries, listed above; non-traditional ACP countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Ghana, and Kenya; and non-ACP countries, which encompass all other countries, including those in Latin America. 371 Ibid., pp. 1465, 1469-70. 372 Roland Herrmann, Marc Kramb, Christina Monnich. (December 2000). Tariff Rate Quotas and the Economic Impacts of Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the WTO. [Online]. Available: http://www.uni-giessen.de/zeu/DiscPap1.pdf [July 31, 2001], p. 15. 373 See, e.g., House of Commons. (January 14, 1998). Select Committee on European Legislation: Sixteenth Report. [Online]. Available: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-off [July 31, 2001]. 374 Costa Rica received 23.4 percent, Colombia 21.0 percent, Nicaragua 3.0 percent, and Venezuela 2.0 percent of the quota for third-country banana suppliers. Herrmann, Kramb, Monnich. (December 2000). Tariff Rate Quotas and the Economic Impacts of Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the WTO. [Online]. . . . , p. 17. 375 Bhala, "The Bananas War ," . . . , pp. 1464, 1469. 376 European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Ecuador's Complaint: Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/ECU, May 22, 1997. 377 European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R, September 9, 1997, pp. 162-63. The WTO found that among the violated provisions were GATT Article XIII:1, which states that a country may not restrict the importation of a product from one member without similarly restricting importation of that product from all other members, and the Most Favored Nation clause, Article I:1, which requires that any "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" granted to one country with respect to a certain product be granted to all member countries with respect to that product. Ibid.; GATT, Articles XIII:1, I:1. 378 "US Government and European Commission Reach Agreement to Resolve Long-Standing Banana Dispute," European Union News Release, April 11, 2001. 379 Herrmann, Kramb, Monnich. (December 2000). Tariff Rate Quotas and the Economic Impacts of Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the WTO. [Online]. . . . , p. 17; World Bank, Project SICA, Agricultural Information, System Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock-Ecuador. (No date). Regime on Principal Markets: The Banana Regime of the European Union in Force as of January 1, 1999. [Online]. Available: http://www.sica.gov.ec/ingles/cadenas/banano/docs/reglam1637.htm [August 1, 2001]. 380 "US Government and European Commission Reach Agreement . . . ," European Union News Release. 381 Eliza Patterson, "The US-E.U. Agreement to Resolve the Banana Dispute," ASIL Insight: US-E.U. Banana Dispute Agreement, April 2001. 382 "US Government and European Commission Reach Agreement . . . ," European Union News Release. The United States lifted sanctions on July 1, 2001. "USTR Removes Duties on E.U. Goods Imposed in Banana Dispute," Market News International, July 2, 2001. 383 "Understanding on Bananas," European Union Press Release, April 30, 2001. 384 Patterson, "The US-E.U. Agreement . . . ," ASIL Insight: US-E.U. Banana Dispute Agreement. 385 "Understanding on Bananas," European Union Press Release. 386 Ibid.; "Commission Approves Banana Regs. After Settling with Ecuador," Inside U.S. Trade, May 4, 2001, p. 19. Dole, Ecuador's second largest exporter, had also objected to the licensing scheme because license allocation, until December 2003, is to be based on E.U. market share between 1994 and 1996, a period during which Dole's importation of Ecuadorian bananas in the European Union was significantly lower than in later years. 387 "Understanding on Bananas," European Union Press Release. |