Much of the Tanzanian government's recent hostility against refugees is due to the fact that the refugee flows in the Great Lakes region have been "a cocktail of good and bad" as one Tanzanian official put it.12 Like many refugee settings, those in the Great Lakes region contain militants whose manipulation of refugee camps as a source of recruitment, financing, and protection threatens to undermine the civilian and humanitarian nature of international refugee assistance and to destabilize the security of the host country. Within the Great Lakes region, this destabilization has had a devastating domino effect: one internal conflict after another has spilled over, pulling neighboring countries into a seemingly intractable and inter-linked regional conflict.
The Tanzanian government has legitimate security concerns with regard to those who seek to use the refugee cover either to conduct cross-border military activities or to evade prosecution for human rights violations they have committed previously in their own country. Cross-border militant activity by Burundian rebel groups in Tanzania fluctuates depending on events within Burundi. Additionally, in the past few years, common crime has become more of a problem around the border areas, often attributed to former Rwandan Hutu militia, interahamwe, who make their living through banditry. Weapons in western Tanzania are easily and increasingly available in the border area (reportedly an AK47 can be purchased for as little as T.shs10,000 to 15,000 [approximately U.S.$15 to $23]),13 and armed robberies and carjackings at gunpoint have increased in the past few years. However, the bulk of refugees in Tanzania do not participate in criminal activities and are as concerned about rebel intimidation and crime as the Tanzanian authorities.
Concerns about destabilization and insecurity caused by the refugee camps are further heightened by events in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire). The specter of the Zairian refugee camps-their forced dispersal by the Rwandan government and allied Zairian factions in 1996, which sparked the ongoing civil war in theDemocratic Republic of Congo-hangs heavy on the minds of Tanzanian and international policymakers.14 However, it is important to note that while security concerns do exist, the refugee situation in Tanzania is fundamentally different. The camps in Tanzania are not as insecure or as lawless as those that existed in Zaire. The Tanzanian authorities and law enforcement officials in the camps are trained professionals whose work has ensured that the civilian nature of the refugee camps is largely retained.
That said, Burundian rebel groups do conduct political, and even military, activities in Tanzania, some of which have been supported by the Tanzanian government in the past. Since 1996, the Council for the Defence of Democracy (Conseil National de la Défense de la Démocratie, CNDD) and the Hutu People's Liberation Front (Partie pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu, PALIPEHUTU) have used Tanzania as their political center, replacing Zaire. But even before then, Burundian rebel groups maintained bases in Tanzania for at least the past decade. The association between Burundian Hutu refugees and their Tanzanian hosts dates back to the 1970s, and some of these Burundian refugees later served in the Tanzanian army or were trained by it. According to Burundian rebel officials and a western diplomat, rebel soldiers continued to be trained in Tanzanian military bases in 1995 and 1996. Tanzania has also permitted Burundian rebel leaders to solicit support on Tanzanian soil from governments such as Sudan and Iran, which maintain embassies in Dar-es-Salaam.15
However, in the past few years Tanzanian policymakers have become more wary about supporting armed insurgent groups following the recent events in the region. Despite accusations by the Burundian government, there does not appear to be a Tanzanian central government policy nowadays to support the Burundian rebel cause in Tanzania, but some rebel activity does occur due both to the porous border area which is difficult to monitor as well as to corrupt or sympathetic local authorities who turn a blind eye at the border.
Toward the end of 1997, the Burundian government charged that the rebels had created new bases in Tanzania. Tensions between the two governments flared as Burundi accused Tanzania of allowing Burundian rebel activity on Tanzanian soil, an allegation denied by Tanzania. Burundian government accusations of Tanzanian partiality in the Burundian conflict include allegations of bias leveled at former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, the key mediator in the Burundian peace talks appointed by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. In November 1997, the situation between the two countries deteriorated to such an extent that cross-border shelling briefly occurred between the Burundian and Tanzanian armies. However, the Tanzanian government has made it clear through public statements and actions that it does not want the confrontation with Burundi to escalate, and in response to the concerns voiced by the Burundian government, Tanzania has stated strongly that it will not allow rebel activity in the refugee camps.
Human Rights Watch tried to ascertain the extent of militarization in the refugee camps through conversations with security personnel, diplomats, international humanitarian workers, Tanzanian police, and refugees themselves. Human Rights Watch was able to verify intimidation and voluntary recruitment in the refugee camps by both CNDD and PALIPEHUTU and its splinter groups, but was unable to find any definitive proof of forced recruitment or activearming and training in the refugee camps. Human Rights Watch did not investigate rebel activity outside of the refugee camps, although it is widely accepted that rebel Burundians have launched armed attacks on the northeast and south of Burundi from Tanzanian territory. However, the vast majority of the refugees are not implicated.
Like many other refugee camps around the world, the Tanzanian camps are used by rebel group members as a safe haven for their wives and children; as a retreat from armed activity in Burundi; for recruitment of new rebel members; for fundraising; and to obtain medical treatment for injuries incurred during armed activities in Burundi. A doctor in the camps verified treating refugees with bullet wounds and mine fragments, injuries he speculated were likely to have been sustained during fighting, although possibly incurred during refugee flight.16
Within the Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania, there is rebel activity, which appears to be greater in the Ngara camps than in the Kibondo camps. The influence of the rebel groups inside the refugee camps appears to be held in check in part by the work of the Tanzanian authorities and in part due to rebel group in-fighting, disorganization, and bad supply lines. These insurgent groups were weakened by the disruption of their bases in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo in late 1996 when the refugee camps were cleared and most of them fled to Tanzania.
Refugees in the Ngara and Kibondo camps are regularly "taxed" by rebel groups. Refugees interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Lukole camp verified that there was intimidation by both CNDD and PALIPEHUTU members who regularly came through the camp to raise funds. These sources appeared to be more fearful of PALIPEHUTU, whose presence in the camps appears to have strengthened since 1995. Some spoke of a coerced Tshs.300 [approximately U.S.$0.50] tax that PALIPEHUTU imposes on each refugee family.17 Other refugees said that CNDD did the same thing but that, since it had greater support in the camp, the contribution was given more voluntarily. Other refugees spoke of a food tax and mentioned that after food distributions, rebels demand a portion of the food ration.18
More disturbing than the reports of forced monetary contributions to the rebel groups was a 1998 report of a vigilante justice system operated by the rebels in one of the camps. Although the authorities took action in this instance, continued attention is required to ensure that the rebels are not able to use such tactics within the camps again. In January 1998, the chief security guardian for Lukole camp reported that CNDD supporters were operating a "detention center" in a home in the camp where they reportedly interrogated and used violence against refugees whom they suspected of spying for the Burundian government. This report was confirmed when Chantal Bakamiriza, a Burundian national who had come to the camp on her university holidays to visit her mother in the camp, was detained by a group of refugees that included a former body-guard for President Ndadaye and a former captain in the Burundian army. She alleged that she was beaten and tortured. Two of her captors were arrested on February 1, 1998, when the Tanzanian police raided the home.19
Refugees tentatively and fearfully confirmed that there was rebel recruitment particularly in the Ngara camps, but stated that it was voluntary. There is some evidence that Hutu fighters cross the border near Kibondo in search of recruits in the refugee camps. In early 1998, three groups of thirty-two Hutu men arrived at the camps to seek recruits. Once reported to the Tanzanian authorities, they declared themselves to be militants and were reportedly returned to Burundi. A former Burundian army officer in Mtabila camp was reportedly recruiting refugees in 1998.20 In late 1998, a truckful of unarmed young men from Lukole camp was intercepted by chance by a UNHCR field officer. Two weeks later, four truckloads of young unarmed men were stopped in Kibondo and intercepted by thepolice. The adult refugees among this group were subsequently sentenced for leaving the camp illegally.21 Reports of recruitment were much more difficult to verify, and opinions differed as to the extent of the practice.
Training and weapons possession within the refugee camps appear to be limited due to the vigilance of the Tanzanian authorities. The rebel groups appear determined not to provoke the Tanzanian authorities and have been careful to ensure that these activities are done clandestinely outside the refugee camp setting. One U.N. security officer told Human Rights Watch that in 1998, rebel training sites appeared to have moved to the Burundian side of the border and that little or no active training was occurring on the Tanzanian side.22 Human Rights Watch heard of several instances of young refugee men exercising in groups but found no reports of open military training after mid-1997. In mid-1997, a group of young refugee men at Muyovosi extension were reportedly conducting basic training exercises (including squad and battalion training) using sticks instead of guns. This was stopped after it was brought to the attention of the Tanzanian authorities by an international humanitarian organization.23 In 1998, there were reports that Hutu refugees were engaged in military training near both the Ngara and Kibondo camps; upon investigation the authorities found groups of young men jogging and doing calisthenics but no concrete evidence that this was for a military purpose.24 There have been reports that both CNDD and PALIPEHUTU train some five to ten kilometers outside Lukole camp, but Human Rights Watch could not verify this.25 Periodically, raids of the camps are conducted by the Tanzanian authorities, but very rarely are weapons and ammunition found.
Often, the amount of rebel activity in Tanzania corresponds to political developments within Burundi. In early 1999, in anticipation of the April peace talks, rebel activity in and around the Tanzanian camps increased. As one observer put it: "in the dynamics of peace-making, there is war-making to hold ground in the negotiations."26 For some of the Burundian opposition groups, the refugees are the only power base that they can recruit and mobilize support through. In early 1999, several cross-border attacks from Tanzania did occur, eventually prompting the Burundian government to protest officially to the Tanzanian government that an attempted infiltration by 500 Burundian rebels had occurred from the Tanzanian side of the border. The Burundian authorities said the rebels were supported by a group in one of the Tanzanian refugee camps, a charge denied by UNHCR.27
In a commendable move, the Tanzanian government and UNHCR permitted and assisted a refugee delegation to attend the April 1999 Burundian peace talks (taking place in Arusha, Tanzania) as observers so they could report back on the progress of the talks to the larger refugee population. Following the peace talks, former Tanzanian president and chief negotiator of the talks, Julius Nyerere, visited the refugee camps and spoke directly with the refugees about the negotiations. This type of structured political activity should be further encouraged, because it engages the refugee population constructively in the peace process and allows refugees who are interested in being involved an opportunity distinct from involvement with the rebels.
In addition to cross-border activity by Burundian rebels, there has also been an increase in banditry in western Tanzania. Much of this crime in the Ngara area is attributed to former Rwandan refugees (referred to generically as interahamwe) who were in the refugee camps until December 1996 when the Rwandan refugees were forcibly returned by the Tanzanian authorities, and who fled to the forests to avoid repatriation. Human Rights Watch interviewed international humanitarian workers and refugees in Ngara camp who described being held up at gunpoint outside thecamp area. The Rwandans responsible for the crime have been living in groups, eluding the Tanzanian authorities and surviving through banditry. Human Rights Watch interviewed a nineteen-year-old Burundian refugee woman who had been abducted by one such group of about twenty Rwandan men in the Ngara area when she left the camp to search for firewood. She was held for ten months and used by one of the men for sex and labor before she was able to escape and return to her family in the camp. She verified that there are a number of such groups of Rwandans in the area who make their living through armed robbery.28
The Tanzanian authorities legitimately seek to control those who would use the refugee cover to violate the law. However, it is convenient and easy to make blanket accusations against all refugees for the crime that occurs in western Tanzania. Though some of the crime is committed by refugees, some is also committed by Tanzanian nationals. While rebel activity and crime are perpetrated by some of those who have sought refuge in Tanzania, Tanzanian public opinion frequently depicts all refugees indiscriminately as harbingers of crime and insecurity. Such blanket accusations only feed the xenophobia that is increasingly evident in Tanzania and become the justification for restrictive policies, such as the round-ups, that unnecessarily trample on the dignity and rights of refugees. In addition, these accusations are inconsistent with the facts. The vast majority of refugees in Tanzania are law-abiding. Most refugees are fearful of the rebel intimidation and activity that is occurring in Tanzania and are equally at risk of crime when they leave the confines of the camps.
12 Human Rights Watch interview, John Mwaka, Nduta camp commander and Andrew Kibona, Nduta assistant camp commander, Nduta camp, June 1, 1998. 13 Human Rights Watch interview, U.N. staff member, Dar-es-Salaam, May 20, 1998; Human Rights Watch interview, diplomat, Dar-es-Salaam, May 21, 1998. At the time of these interviews, one U.S.$ was equivalent to approximately 650 Tanzanian shillings. 14 See generally, Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Casualties of War, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms," A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 11, no. 01(A), February 1999; Human Rights Watch/Africa, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo," A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 9, no. 9(A), December 1997; Human Rights Watch/Africa and Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, "Democratic Republic of Congo: What Kabila is Hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo," A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 9, no. 5(A), October 1997; Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Zaire: Transition, War and Human Rights," A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 9, no. 2(A), April 1997; Human Rights Watch/Africa and Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, "Attacked by All Sides: Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire," A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 9, no. 1(A), March 1997. 15 The Sudanese and Iranian embassies in Dar-es-Salaam transferred funds to a Burundian rebel leader to his National Bank of Commerce account in Dar-es-Salaam. Human Rights Watch was able to confirm this with bank documents, but neither the amount nor the purposes of these funds were disclosed. 16 Human Rights Watch interview, doctor, Mtendeli camp, June 2, 1998. 17 Human Rights Watch interview, refugees, Lukole camp, June 7 and 8, 1998. 18 Human Rights Watch interview, refugees, Lukole camp, June 7 and 8, 1998. 19 Human Rights Watch interview, UNHCR staff member, Geneva, May 14, 1998. 20 Human Rights Watch interview, UNHCR staff member, Geneva, May 14, 1998. 21 Human Rights Watch interview, UNHCR Tanzania staff member, Nairobi, May 5, 1999 22 Human Rights Watch telephone interview, U.N. security officer, New York, May, 1998. 23 Human Rights Watch telephone interview, U.N. security officer, New York, May, 1998. 24 Human Rights Watch interview, UNHCR staff member, Geneva, May 14, 1998; Human Rights Watch telephone interview, U.N. security officer, New York, May, 1998; Human Rights Watch interview, U.N. staff member, Dar-es-Salaam, May 20, 1998. 25 Human Rights Watch interview, UNHCR staff member, Geneva, May 14, 1998. 26 Human Rights Watch interview, refugee relief worker, Nairobi, April 29, 1999. 27 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) Central-Eastern Africa Update No. 647, April 12, 1999 available at http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int. 28 Human Rights Watch interview, refugee woman, Lukole camp, June 7, 1998.