Local human rights defenders told Human Rights Watch that the latest incident began on Friday night, April 30, when an Aceh Merdeka rally was held in Cot Murong (also written Cut Murong and Cut Ngurong), a village about twelve kilometers west of Lhokseumawe. Such rallies, known as dakwah GAM --Muslim proselytization meetings organized by Aceh Merdeka -- have been held with increasing frequency in the Lhokseumawe area since late 1998, and this particular gathering was held to celebrate the Muslim new year, Muharram.

The May 3, 1999 Killings in Aceh Section I Section II: The Shootings on May 3 Section III: Background to the Shootings Section IV: Events in Lhokseumawe, August 1998-April 1999

During the rally, villagers spotted two soldiers together, an army sergeant, Sgt. Editia Warman, known as Edi, from Detachment 001 of the Indonesian army's Guided Missile Air Defense Unit, and a village security officer, Sergeant Rahman Pagan. Villagers told local human rights investigators that they knew Sergeant Edi well but that they suspected his friend, Sergeant Rahma, of being a provocateur, so they took both men into custody.⁽¹⁾

According to the villagers, the two were questioned and then let go. But a source at the detachment base said they had not returned the next day. Their disappearance sparked a major manhunt early Sunday morning in the villages of Cot Murong and Lancang Barat, involving hundreds of soldiers from Detachment 001, the police, and the mobile police brigade. In the process of the search for the soldiers, security forces beat up twleve civilians in the village. People were already angry because the military search came in the middle of preparations for a religious feast (kenduri). They became even angrier about the beatings, news of which rapidly spread.

At 7:30, according to a local account, one of the villagers went to the mosque in Lancang Barat and, using the loudspeakers there, called on all villagers to gather in the football field, the same place that the rally on April 30 had been held. Thousands of people poured out of their homes onto the field, and eventually three village elders were selected to negotiate with the army. They reportedly reached a three-point agreement that the military would not enter the area unless they had specific permission from subdistrict officials and local community leaders; that if they entered anyway, the villagers would have the right to expel them; and that the twelve victims of violence that morning would receive free medical treatment until they recovered, plus Rp.50,000 (just over U.S.$5) in compensation.⁽²⁾

On Sunday afternoon, as the kenduri was taking place, a stranger appeared in the village, arousing new suspicions that he was a provocateur, apparently based only on the grounds that no one had seen him before. That evening, the village went on high alert.⁽³⁾ People from Cot Murong filled the main Banda Aceh-Medan road until the next day. Thousands of villagers from Lancang Barat, Keude Blang, Geuleumpang Sulu Barat, Teupin Tirom, Cot Murong, and Paloh Lada also turned out for night patrol in and around their villages, fearing that the army would try to infiltrate and take suspects away in the middle of the night, as they had in the early 1990s during counterinsurgency operations.⁽⁴⁾

Then, around 9:00 p.m., word went out that the hamlet of Teupin in Lancang Barat village was surrounded by troops, and a few hours later, that four truckloads of soldiers on patrol drove around the villages of Cot Murong and Lancang Barat. Villagers believed the military was violating the agreement they had reached that morning, according to a local account.⁽⁵⁾ They therefore decided to mobilize all villages in the area to challenge the army's actions.

People began gathering that night in the football field, and on Monday, trucks full of people were still arriving. At 9:00 a.m Monday morning, two trucks of soldiers arrived, but the villagers chased them away. In the thousands, they then set out to march toward to the regional military headquarters, Korem 011, to express their grievances. It was clear then that violence was a possibility; student activists in the crowd, according to their own account, tried to persuade the crowd that "anarchical" actions would be counterproductive.⁽⁶⁾ When the crowd arrived at a major intersection in front of an industrial plant, Kertas Kraft Aceh, they were met by the Dewantara subdistrict head (camat) and military commander, and troops from Infantry Battalion 113. (Seven soldiers from this battalion, based in Bireun, had been killed on December 29--in an attack attributed by the army to Aceh Merdeka--and other Battalion 113 soldiers had killed four detainees, apparently in revenge, in an attack in Lhokseumawe on January 9. The impartiality of that unit in a tense situation was thus open to question.) A dialogue ensued between leaders of the marchers and the subdistrict chief, but shortly after an agreement appeared to have been reached, more troops from different military units arrived.

Shortly after noon, the crowd, angered at the repeated violation of the May 2 agreement, began throwing stones at the subdistrict military office and burned two motorcycles belonging to soldiers stationed there. Two more trucks, this time with soldiers from the Guided Missile detachment (Rudal 001) arrived and were also greeted by rocks thrown at them by the marchers. At this point, according to several different accounts, the soldiers on the truck opened fire.⁽⁷⁾

The military's version of the story, as conveyed by Maj. Gen. Syamsul Ma'arif, spokesman for armed forces headquarters in Jakarta, is that on Friday, April 30, Sergeant Edi left the Detachment 001 base to visit a relative in Cot Murong. He found himself in the middle of the religious rally, and no security forces were present. The next day, someone reported to detachment headquarters that Sergeant Edi had been taken hostage in Cot Murong by Aceh Merdeka forces of Hasan di Tiro (the Sweden-based leader of the rebel group). On Sunday, May 2, therefore, members of the detachment began patrols to hunt for Sergeant Edi in the village of Cot Murong. Rumors spread that the hamlet was going to be attacked by the army. As a result on May 3 about 7,000 people set out to attack the detachment base. Because they were under attack, the detachment command sought help from the regional military command (Korem 011/Lila Wangsa), which accordingly sent one company to the scene.⁽⁸⁾ The company left base around 2:00 p.m.. When it arrived in Cot Murong, however, it was blocked by the people, and suddenly, shooting broke out from inside the crowd. The forces returned fire in self-defense.

The regional army commander, Col. Johny Wahab, also said that the Indonesian army's actions were necessary to safeguard the arsenal of missiles, which, if they exploded, could destroy Lhokseumawe.⁽⁹⁾

That there was some Aceh Merdeka involvement in organizing villagers in the period April 30 to May 3 is a possibility; after all, the April 30 rally, as noted, was a dakwah GAM. But even if such involvement could be documented-- and thus far it has not been--it would not justify the apparently indiscriminate firing on the crowd of marchers. A thorough, impartial investigation is clearly in order.

Notes
1. FARMIDIA, "Kronologi Pembantaian Masyakarat Sipil Oleh TNI di Simpang KK A Lhokseumawe, Dewantara, Aceh Utara, Tanggal 3 Mei, 1999.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. "23 Tewas Deberondong Di Dewantara," Waspada, May 3, 1999.

5. FARMIDIA, "Kronologi Pembantaian Masyakarat Sipil Oleh TNI di Simpang KK A Lhokseumawe, Dewantara, Aceh Utara, Tanggal 3 Mei, 1999.

6. Ibid.

7. "Tentara dan Warga Bentrok di Aceh," Kompas, May 4, 1999 and FARMIDIA, "Kronologi Pembantaian Masyakarat Sipil Oleh TNI di Simpang KK A Lhokseumawe, Dewantara, Aceh Utara, Tanggal 3 Mei, 1999.

8. Each level of military command has a number and a name. Korem stands for Kommando Resort Militer. The next levels down are Kodim (district level) and Koramil (subdistrict level).

9. Kompas,May 5, 1999.