Background Briefing

VI. Preventing Communal Violence

Since April 2006, there has been an increase in communal violence among the country’s Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities which the government and the LTTE have sought to use for their own advantage.

On April 12, a bomb believed to have been set by the LTTE exploded in the crowded Trincomalee vegetable market, which is dominated by Sinhalese traders. Five people died in the explosion. Within about fifteen minutes, seemingly organized Sinhalese mobs armed with poles and long knives began a rampage through the town’s business district, setting on fire Tamil businesses and homes. About 30 shops and other businesses, virtually all Tamil-owned, were burned. Persons believed to be Tamil were attacked and several were killed. For nearly two hours, the numerous navy and army personnel and the police stood by in broad daylight while the mobs, never numbering more than100 to150 people, looted, killed and destroyed. Security forces present outside the Hatton National Bank, for instance, took no action against a crowd trying to break into a cash machine. Altogether that day, 19 people were reported killed and another 75 injured.88

The Trincomalee violence encouraged violence in neighboring areas. After the body of a young Sinhalese man was found in Manhindapura on April 14, Sinhalese villagers went on a rampage in the neighboring Tamil village of Nadespura and set fire to over forty homes and a Hindu temple. After the LTTE killed two policemen on April 21 in a landmine attack in Menkamam, a Sinhalese mob killed a Tamil farmer in reprisal. When on the same day another LTTE landmine killed a Sinhalese home guard and injured a policeman in Dehiwatte, a Sinhalese mob stabbed to death a Tamil man. The violence in the district caused more than 700 families to flee their homes to find refuge in schools and other public buildings. Some of the homes of Tamils who fled Dehiwatte were burned and looted.89

A. Support inter-ethnic networks

The Mutur area in Trincomalee district has long been the scene of ethnic violence between the Tamil and Muslim populations, which are about equal in size. The situation is complicated by the area’s proximity to the boundary between government and LTTE-controlled areas. Beginning in December 2005 there was a series of ethnic killings and reprisals that threatened to lead to more widespread violence. The Mutur peace committee, working with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and non-governmental organizations, often intervened to stop the cycle of violence.

For example, on January 9 a group of drunken Tamils attacked and threatened to kill a Muslim in the village of Manalchenai. Two senior members of the Mutur peace committee were contacted, one a Tamil priest and the other a Muslim community leader, and informed that this was a personal matter, not a case of communal violence. The two went to the victim’s village nearby and asked the people for calm. At the same time, a non-governmental organization rescued the man and took him to Mutur hospital. Because of the existing inter-ethnic network, the situation was defused without an escalation of communal violence.90

Inter-ethnic networks called citizens’ committees or peace committees have been established in a number of areas with mixed ethnic populations. These networks typically consist of local religious and community leaders of high standing. When effective, they can play an important role in defusing tensions and quashing rumors likely to incite or exacerbate ethnic violence, alerting members of other communities to possible violence, and taking measures during outbreaks of violence to help protect individuals from other communities at particular risk. Unfortunately many peace and citizens’ committees have become inoperative in recent months because of threats against their members.

Recommendation 28: The Sri Lankan government and LTTE should give full recognition to local efforts by civilians to establish or revive inter-ethnic networks, such as citizens’ or peace committees, to address ethnic concerns and help defuse communal tension. They should engage with these networks to find ways to reduce dangers to the civilian population. Both sides should take measures to stop threats and violence against committee members and take appropriate action against members of their forces responsible.

B. Appoint local officials sensitive to ethnic concerns

Immediately following the April 2006 communal violence in Trincomalee (described above), the Sri Lankan security forces called a meeting of the citizens’ committee, which consisted of local religious and community leaders from the town. While the Sinhalese community and all the religious leaders were present, no Tamil or Muslim community representatives participated in the meeting. As a result the meeting focused on issues of concern only to the Sinhalese community, primarily their security. The high-level delegation sent by President Mahinda Rajapakse two days after the violence, which included the Inspector General of Police, reportedly announced measures to provide compensation to harmed traders and rejuvenate area peace committees. But the delegation reportedly did little to defuse existing tension and fear in the area.91

More positively, after the Trincomale communal violence the government replaced the senior superintendent of police with an individual who has had some success reducing ethnic tensions. After a grenade blast killed three police personnel, two army soldiers, a woman member of the home guard and a civilian at Anuradhapura Junction on July 3,92 he went to the area and prevented reprisals.

To prevent communal violence from occurring, the government has a responsibility to appoint senior police officials who are both committed to protecting all members of society and who are viewed as playing such a role. Particularly in the north and east, a demonstrated commitment and openness to all communities—and Tamil language ability—should be important considerations for senior appointments.

Recommendation 29: The Sri Lankan government and armed forces should ensure that senior civilian and military officials serving multi-ethnic communities are genuinely sensitive to the concerns of all communities and have the ability, including necessary language skills, to do their job effectively.




88 See INFORM et al., “Report: Fact-Finding Mission to Trincomalee, April 16-17, 2006.”

89 See UTHR(J), “Flight, Displacement and the Two-fold Reign of Terror,” Information Bulletin No. 40, June 15, 2006.

90 Human Rights Watch interview, Colombo, August 16, 2006.

91 See INFORM, et al., “Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Trincomalee: April 16-17, 2006.”

92 Ministry of Defense, Media Centre for National Security, Situation report for July 3, 2006.