Background Briefing

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Introduction

On September 18, 2005, Afghanistan will hold elections to choose a national assembly and local councils for the country’s 34 provinces.  The elections, which were originally scheduled to occur simultaneously with last year’s presidential election but were delayed for almost a year, should be an important step forward in Afghanistan’s still nascent democracy-building process.

To assess these elections from a human rights persepective, Human Rights Watch has been conducting research throughout the country in the lead-up to the elections, focusing on basic freedoms for candidates and voters, perceptions about political rights, freedom of expression, and women’s rights.1

In many ways, the election process so far has surpassed expectations.  Millions of Afghans have registered to vote, thousands of polling sites have been prepared, and millions of ballots printed.  Despite severe logistical hurdles, misunderstandings about the process among many Afghans, and the continuing effects of insecurity across the country, the process—in most areas at least—has proceeded without serious disruption or violence, and Afghanistan is engaged in a real political dialogue.

However, there are serious causes for concern about the election, and questions remain as to whether contests will fairly reflect popular will and serve as the basis for genuine political development.

The biggest immediate problem is that anti-government, anti-coalition forces, including former Taliban forces and forces under the former mujahideen leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, continue to operate at will in many districts in the south and southeast, carrying out assassinations, attacking civilian government workers and humanitarian staff, and intimidating election workers and potential voters and candidates.  These attacks have severely impacted campaigning activities in the south and southeast, and further attacks may seriously harm the integrity of the election.

The second serious problem is Afghanistan’s continuing “warlord problem.”  In regions across the country, voters and candidates voiced strong concerns to us about the intimidating power of local or regional de facto strongmen—mostly former militia commanders, known in Dari or Pashto as jangsalaran, or warlords.  Many candidates, especially outside of the south, stated that problems with warlords were the most serious challenge they faced in running for office.  Many expressed to Human Rights Watch serious frustration and disappointment about the failure of election authorities, and the Afghan government, to limit the ability of warlords to stand for office.2  In many areas, fear of local commanders has compromised the election process.  Candidates and voters from all over the country told Human Rights Watch that this fear has limited their participation and influenced what they feel safe doing or saying in public.  

Another worrying area is women’s participation.  Human Rights Watch is concerned about the numerous and ongoing obstacles facing women candidates, who comprise about 10 percent of all candidates.  In late August, Human Rights Watch released a report about problems and challenges facing women candidates and voters in the lead-up to the elections.3  The report described how women candidates continue to confront numerous challenges to equal participation, including weak guarantees of physical safety, limited access to information, restricted movement around the country, and lack of financial resources compared to men.  As the report detailed, many of Afghanistan’s security problems disproportionately affect women candidates and voters, who, due to long-standing inequalities and discrimination, are at greater risk of being targeted for attacks or threats—whether from insurgents or local commanders. 

Lastly, Human Rights Watch is concerned about the potential for future violence.  As explained in more detail below, Afghanistan’s electoral law currently contains an “assassination clause,” which allows losing candidates to take the seats of winners who die or resign from office.  We are seriously concerned that losing candidates may take advantage of this clause by resorting to violence after election results are announced.

Recommendations

Ultimately, the September 18 elections will exhibit both the successes and failures of the fledgling Afghan government and its international supporters.  That the government and its international partners have managed to arrange a second national election within a year of last year’s presidential race, without widespread violence and with large-scale participation, demonstrates how much is possible in Afghanistan with even a modest amount of financial support, political will, and security assistance.  

In hindsight, however, these elections may be remembered among Afghans as yet another missed opportunity.  Many Afghans had hoped that aside from electing representatives, these elections could serve to deepen Afghanistan’s legitimate governmental institutions and hasten the end of the rule of warlords and gunmen.  Yet that outcome now seems unlikely.  There is already widespread cynicism about the process at the local level, with many Afghans assuming the results are a foregone conclusion: that warlords and their proxies will take the most seats. 

It did not need to be this way.  Afghanistan’s international partners, through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), could have provided better security arrangements in remote areas, and sooner.  Electoral rules could have been written to sideline or at least discourage potential candidates implicated in war crimes and serious rights abuses.4  The Afghan government could have created a more robust Electoral Commission, with the power to effectively investigate candidates’ links to armed factions, and disqualify those retaining such links.  And the Afghan government and its international allies could have worked harder to ensure that notorious military commanders with poor human rights records were convinced to stand aside in favor or more qualified and less tarnished representatives.

Of course, it is now too late to fix many of the problems identified in this report.  But it is not too late to improve Afghanistan’s future political environment, by offering political support to and protecting the country’s legitimate leaders and institutions and working to sideline abusive persons from positions of power.  It is not too late for the Electoral Complaints Commission to disqualify additional candidates who have violated electoral law or who maintain links with armed factions (under Afghanistan’s election law, candidates, even after elected, can be disqualified up until taking the oath of office).  It is not too late to increase the number of international security forces in the country and U.N. political affairs and human rights monitors (the number of security forces and monitors, though expanded over the last year, are still woefully inadequate and far fewer than the number deployed in other conflict and post-conflict areas).  And it is not too late to redouble efforts to properly train a professional army and police force that could displace and truly disarm and disband militias, and to help build an effective and fair judicial and penal system.

We strongly urge the Afghan government and international community to take such steps.  They are necessary steps: Afghanistan’s security situation remains precarious.  And many Afghans are understandably worried about the future, fearing that the international community may turn its attention away from Afghanistan after the election, and that troop deployments from ISAF may decrease, even if only temporarily, thereby jeopardizing the delicate security situation.  Local and international security forces should remain on high alert and continue to provide security to
candidates and elected members through the announcement of results and the first sitting of the new parliament.

This election must not be viewed as a final chapter in Afghanistan’s reconstruction efforts—on the contrary, it should be viewed as part of a longer process.  Afghanistan’s international friends and donors must redouble their efforts in coming years to strengthen the rule of law, protect vulnerable persons and groups, and help Afghanistan rebuild its institutions—or risk having its efforts wasted if Afghanistan backslides into authoritarianism and violence in later years.

These are important elections.  Last year’s presidential election was indeed critical and historic, but aside from electing a president, Afghans have not had the opportunity to choose anyone to represent their local interests, and until now, Afghanistan has been governed without a legislative, or law-making, branch of government.  These elections could go a long way towards addressing this democratic deficit, creating for the first time a representative legislative process and a representative forum for debate about the country’s past, present, and future.

Yet it is important for those concerned about Afghanistan’s future to take these elections for what they are: an important but tentative step on the path to a representative political system, held against a backdrop of decades of extraordinary violence and continued warlord domination—domination that in many parts of the country has perpetuated an atmosphere of deep and well-founded fear.  This fear, in turn, has significantly limited debate of key issues and discouraged the participation of many potential parties and candidates, all of which has circumscribed the choices offered to voters. How this will affect the election results is unknowable, but what is unacceptable in democracies elsewhere must not be deemed acceptable in Afghanistan.  A sober and clear-eyed analysis of these elections will be essential if better elections, reaching closer to international standards, are to be achieved in the future.



[1] This report] is based on over 100 interviews with candidates and voters—men and women from both rural and urban areas, in provinces across Afghanistan—as well as discussions and consultations with Afghan and international election officials.  Human Rights Watch spoke with officials in the Afghan Electoral Commission and Joint Election Monitoring Body (JEMB), the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), the European Union (EU) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) election observation teams, and other officials involved in election observation efforts, both domestic and international.  We also compared our information with numerous Afghan and foreign journalists, who have been interviewing candidates and voters across the country.

[2] Through 2005, the Afghan election commission received complaints about over 500 candidates (out of a field of nearly 5,800), but has only disqualified 32 for links to armed factions—11 initially, and another 21 on September 12.  None of the more senior commanders running in the elections, whose records of human rights violations are well-known to Afghans, were disqualified.

[3] See Human Rights Watch, “Campaigning against Fear: Women’s Participation in Afghanistan’s 2005 Elections,” A Human Rights Watch Short Report, August 2005, available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/wrd/afghanistan0805/index.htm.

[4] For recommendations on how the electoral registration process for candidates could be designed to help exclude alleged war criminals and human rights abusers, see Human Rights Watch, “Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s Legacy of Impunity,” A Human Rights Watch report, July 2005, recommendations section, available at: http://hrw.org/reports/2005/afghanistan0605/7.htm#_Toc105552371.


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