Background Briefing

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Protection of Civilians: Lessons Learned from AMIS

Despite AMIS’s efforts to proactively interpret its mandate for protection of civilians “whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability,”4 it has been severely hampered in these efforts. Internal constraints include a lack of institutional expertise and technical capacity in deploying multi-sectoral field missions. External constraints include the continuing obstruction of the Sudanese government, inadequate funding from international donor governments and insufficient military equipment and logistics.

As a result, AMIS’ deterrent effect has diminished as its own forces have succumbed to deadly attacks. Attacks on humanitarian aid convoys by rebel groups, Janjaweed forces and bandits and continuing Janjaweed and government attacks on civilians, including those living in camps, have become widespread in the past several months. The primary responsibility for the deterioration in the security situation belongs to the warring parties, who continue to attack civilians and civilian objects in violation of international humanitarian law, and the government, which has created a climate of lawlessness by permitting Janjaweed forces to commit crimes with impunity. But it is also clear that AMIS’ ability to counter such attacks is limited by its low numbers and other constraints.

The African Union Peace and Security Council on March 10 extended the mandate of AMIS in Darfur through September 30, 2006. U.N. plans call for AMIS troops to be a mainstay of the future U.N. force in Darfur by retraining the AMIS soldiers and then “re-hatting” them and incorporating them into a larger U.N. force with improved logistical support and arms. This would expedite the introduction of the U.N. force and ensure that vital institutional knowledge and experience is retained within the future U.N. mission.  The introduction of a U.N. force will also provide an opportunity to strengthen AMIS regarding size, funding, mandate, and capacity — and, in particular, mobility.



[4] The revised AMIS mandate of October 2004 included “[p]rotecting civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability.” African Union Peace and Security Council, “Communiqué,” paragraph 6, October 20, 2004. The mandate is discussed in detail in Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change.”


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