Background Briefing

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Failure to Control the Army: Abuses against Civilians and a Threat to Elections

 

With army integration incomplete, formerly belligerent forces remain hostile to the transition process and each retains its’ own chain of command parallel to the official FARDC structure. Some occasionally engage in combat with each other. This situation results in continuing abuses against civilians and creates risks for upcoming elections. In conditions of insecurity, voters may hesitate to go to the polls or could be influenced in their vote by pressure from armed groups. Polls conducted under the menace of potential violence from any force displeased by the results are unlikely to be seen as free and fair.

 

Conflict between military units has been most frequent in North and South Kivu where divisions between soldiers often reflect local ethnic divisions: soldiers of the former RCD-Goma often are supported by Congolese Tutsi (and sometimes Congolese Hutu) and soldiers of other units are more usually supported by Congolese of other ethnic groups.

In December 2004 some soldiers of the former RCD-Goma forces, supposedly part of the FARDC, engaged in combat with other FARDC troops in North Kivu. Both sides attacked civilians, deliberately killing more than one hundred and raping and wounding scores of others.15 Reflecting continuing rejection of central military authority, more than a thousand soldiers of the 12th brigade of the former RCD-Goma deserted the national army and headed towards Masisi territory on September 11, 2005.16 MONUC peacekeepers managed to stop some of the deserters and a number of others fled of their own accord, but an estimated six hundred to one thousand more continued on to remote areas where some of them may have joined Laurent Nkunda, a former RCD-Goma general who has threatened to launch a new rebellion against the government.17 In another incident on September 16, former RCD-Goma soldiers of the FARDC became angry when civilians in Rutshuru territory showed their pleasure that troops from this faction were being withdrawn from the area. They shot into a crowd of civilians, killing three boys, aged ten, fifteen and eighteen years old.18

In South Kivu, in early November, formerly RCD-Goma units of the FARDC fought against other FARDC units loyal to the Mai Mai popular combatant forces. At least three civilians were killed during the combat and hundreds of local residents fled to Burundi.19

 

In November FARDC units also attacked Mai Mai groups in central Katanga opposed to the transitional government and responsible for terrorizing the local population. Local church groups report that over sixty thousand people fled their homes as a result of the military operation.20 An earlier operation in late 2004 by FARDC troops in the mining area of Kilwa in Katanga resulted in the killing of some one hundred people, at least twenty-eight of whom were summarily executed.21 One of the FARDC commanders responsible for the operation was subsequently arrested, but has not yet been brought to trial.

 

FARDC integration stalled

The government planned to have eighteen integrated brigades ready to provide security before elections, but as one international observer remarked to a Human Rights Watch researcher, “it will be a miracle if army integration happens at all.”22 In the face of growing difficulties, the government reduced the total number of integrated brigades to be formed from eighteen to twelve, only six of which had been created by early December. The first group of soldiers presented for integration numbered some fourteen thousand, about five thousand fewer than expected23 and their numbers decreased further with desertions and deaths. (See below.) The situation for the next group was even worse. Of thirty-two thousand soldiers expected to be presented for demobilization or integration into new units, only six thousand had arrived at various integration centers by the end of September. Many of these were sick, handicapped or untrained and inexperienced. None of these troops brought any heavy weapons with them.

 

The government claims to have ordered senior army commanders to send their troops for integration but some foreign observers are skeptical. One military expert noted, “These written orders are just to show the diplomats they are doing something, but the orders are not passed on to field commanders or, if they are, they [the commanders] are explicitly told to ignore them.”24 The most notable group not yet sent for integration is President Kabila’s Special Presidential Security Guards (Guardes Spéciales de Securité Presidentiel, GSSP) a unit of some ten thousand to fifteen thousand troops largely from northern Katanga, currently deployed in Kinshasa and other cities including Lubumbashi, Kisangani, Kindu and Bukavu. Foreign military observers have concluded that not just Kabila but also other political leaders are keeping their best soldiers and most important weapons in reserve, perhaps to be used should the election results not be to their satisfaction. 25

 

Reluctant to commit their troops to army integration, politicians and military leaders have been quick to extract personal benefit from the vast sums provided by the international community for the process. As one MONUC official remarked to a Human Rights Watch researcher, “Army integration is an industry and the Congolese have become very good at making money from it.”26 Vice President Ruberwa admitted that 25 percent of money allocated for salary payments each month was embezzled;27 others put the figure much higher.28 In some cases, military officers have defrauded the government by vastly enlarging the ranks under their command by “ghost soldiers” or non-existent troops. Parliamentarian Christophe Lutundula, who is also the chairman of a parliamentary committee examining financial contracts signed during the war years, claimed that $30 million from the budget for the defense of the Kivus had been embezzled.29 Others alleged that President Kabila attempted to profit from donor funds by appointing a family member to a key financial position inside the commission managing the disarmament process, though this attempt was eventually thwarted by donors.30

 

As a result of corruption and mismanagement, soldiers are paid their salaries only irregularly and they frequently lack food, medicines, and equipment. In the town of Beni, for example, scores of the newly integrated soldiers died of cholera in August and September because of inadequate sanitation and medical attention.31 Soldiers who are poorly paid or not paid at all often lack discipline. In Equateur, poorly paid troops went on a rampage in July 2005, killing, raping, and stealing from civilians.32 In Walikali in eastern DRC, one battalion deserted the national army after they failed to receive their salaries in mid-2005, though MONUC’s Indian brigade managed to convince about three hundred of them to return to their base.33 Some soldiers saw the start of voter registration as a chance to obtain some additional funds. They began to harass citizens throughout the country who did not yet have their registration cards, extorting money from them and in some cases beating their victims.34

 

Other rebel groups

Since early in 2005, FARDC troops, supported by increasingly active MONUC peacekeepers, have weakened some of the armed groups that have troubled eastern Congo for years, but they have not yet eradicated all pockets of insecurity.

 

Under pressure from the FARDC and MONUC forces, more than fifteen thousand members of armed groups in Ituri agreed to lay down their weapons in March and April 2005, but others who refused to disarm increased attacks on MONUC peacekeepers and government soldiers. Combatants refusing disarmament took control of areas near the towns of Boga, Kilo and Nioka between August and November, forcing thousands of civilians to flee their homes.

 

More recently FARDC soldiers supported by MONUC peacekeepers have launched operations against groups of combatants, many of them of Rwandan origin, in both North and South Kivu. Rwandan rebels known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratique de la Libération du Rwanda, FDLR) and an FDLR splinter group calling itself the “Rastas” continued abuses of civilians, including deliberate killings, rapes, and abductions for ransom. Some of these attacks were apparently meant as retaliation for previous FARDC and MONUC military operations. On July 9, for example, members of a Rwandan armed group herded villagers into their homes and then set fire to them, killing more than thirty people. The day before, MONUC had attacked an FDLR military camp only a few kilometers away. In South Kivu, armed groups have concentrated their abuses in Walungu and Bunyakiri territories where they have killed, abducted and raped scores of civilians. According to a MONUC human rights team, armed combatants killed fifty civilians, mostly women and children, and forced the displacement of some three thousand persons from the South Kivu village of Kabingu in late July.35

 

Citizens and election workers will find it difficult to get to the polls in this region unless FDLR and other armed groups as well as government soldiers halt combat and abuses against civilians during this period.

 



[15] See Human Rights Watch, “Civilians Attacked in North Kivu,” A Human Rights Watch short report, Vol 17 No. 9(A), July 13, 2005.

[16] They were reportedly joined by soldiers from the RCD-Goma 5th brigade and the 2nd mixed battalion.

[17] Human Rights Watch interview, MONUC officer, Rutshuru, October 10, 2005.

[18] Human Rights Watch interview, MONUC official, Goma, October 18, 2005.

[19] Human Rights Watch interviews, MONUC official, Uvira, November 21, 2005 and FARDC officer, Luvungi, November 26, 2005.

[20] “Fighting displaces 60,000 in Katanga province, Bishop Says,” IRINnews, November 23, 2005 [online] http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50253&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes&SelectCountry=DRC (retrieved December 13, 2005).

[21] MONUC Report, “Conclusions of the Special Investigation into allegations of summary executions and other violations of human rights committed by the FARDC in Kilwa, Katanga”, October 15, 2004.

[22] Human Rights Watch interview, representative of European donor government, Kinshasa, October 3, 2005.

[23] It was expected that brigade size would be 3,200 soldiers but in fact the numbers for each brigade were far fewer. Presentation by Colonel Jean Marc Tafani at the World Bank review of the “Progamme Multi-Pays de Demobilisation et Reintegration” (MDRP), Kinshasa, September 29, 2005.

[24] Human Rights Watch interview, Belgian military expert, Kinshasa, October 2, 2005.

[25] Human Rights Watch interviews, MONUC manager, Kinshasa, September 30, 2005 and foreign military expert, Kinshasa, October 2, 2005.

[26] Human Rights Watch interview, MONUC official, Kinshasa, September 30, 2005.

[27] International Crisis Group, “A Congo Action Plan”, Policy Briefing, October 19, 2005.

[28] Human Rights Watch interview, European diplomat, Kinshasa, October 2, 2005.

[29] “Politicians on notice”, Africa Confidential, Vol. 46, No. 22, November 4, 2005.

[30] Human Rights Watch interviews, representative of European donor, Kinshasa, September 30; MONUC official, October 2, 2005; and international NGO representative, October 3, 2005.

[31] “DRC-EAST AFRICA: 236 soldiers infected with cholera’” IRIN News, August 26, 2005 [online] http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48784&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes&SelectCountry=DRC-EAST_AFRICA (retrieved December 13, 2005).

[32] “DR Congo Troops in Loot Rampage,” BBC News Online, July 4, 2005 [online], http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4648109.stm (retrieved December 13, 2005).

[33] Human Rights Watch interview, General G.V. Satyanarayana, Commander, Indian Brigade of MONUC, Goma, October 6, 2005.

[34] Human Rights Watch researchers heard such reports in several places, including in Kinshasa. Examples were Human Rights Watch interviews, chief military prosecutor, Bunia, October 26, 2005; MONUC official, Uvira, November 21, 2005; civil society representatives, Bukavu, November 29, 2005.

[35] Ibid; U.N. Security Council, Nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2005/603, September 26, 2005 [online] http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/518/95/PDF/N0551895.pdf?OpenElement (retrieved December 13, 2005.


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